We use yearly variations in the price of oil to construct a new instrument to test the impact of an important but often-overlooked foreign aid channel: money given by wealthy OPEC nations to their poorer Muslim allies. The instrument identifies plausibly exogenous variation in foreign aid. We investigate how aid is spent by tracking its short-run effect on aggregate demand, prices, the national accounts, savings, and the balance of payments. We find that much aid is consumed, primarily in the form of higher imports of non-capital goods. Some aid is invested and aid has a positive, though statistically imprecise, effect on growth. Aid has no effect on the financial account, but leads to a negative entry on errors and omissions, suggesting unaccounted capital flight.
Introduction
There have been hundreds of articles attempting to measure the impact of foreign aid on macroeconomic performance, in particular economic growth (e.g., Rosenstein-Rodan, 1961; Robinson, 1971; Gupta and Islam, 1983; Mosley et al., 1987; Boone, 1996; Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Subramanian, 2005a and 2005b) . While the results of this literature have been mixed, there has been relatively little focus on what one would actually expect to occur in a normal economy upon receipt of foreign assistance. For instance, foreign aid should not show up as gross domestic product in and of itself -after all, it is not produced inside a country's borders.
However, if a reasonable fraction of it is spent inside the country, it should eventually appear in GDP, whether or not a country is corrupt or mismanaged. Yet as a profession, economists have very little understanding of how it is that foreign aid trickles through the economy.
Foreign aid will, of course, show up on the balance of payments as a net current transfer in the form of a credit to the current account. This has implications for the exchange rate, not to mention export competitiveness (e.g., Gupta et al., 2006; Prati and Tressel, 2006; Rajan and Subramanian, 2005a) . But while economists are concerned with the impact of too much aid on an economy we have very little understanding of how it is that foreign aid affects other parts of the balance of payment statements. From an accounting standpoint, the balance of payments is a double-entry system, so a credit in one sub-account from an aid inflow needs a debit elsewhere. This paper aims to fill those two gaps by examining a foreign aid windfall that poorer Muslim countries have systematically received from rich, oil-producing Arab states. When the price of oil skyrocketed during the 1973-1986 oil crisis (and again post 2000) , OPEC nations took a substantial portion of the windfall they received and gave it away as foreign aid. Although some of this money did go to famines and other disasters around the world, the vast majority went to other Muslim nations. No doubt the motivation for this was largely political: the Gulf countries were trying to quell unrest due to the huge inequality among their co-religionists (between the oil haves and have-notes), as well as to "assure them[selves] a clear position of dominance within the Muslim world" (Kepel, 2002, 69-70) . Strategic aid allocation should come as no surprise, as foreign aid from all sources is strongly influenced by political motives (Alesina and Dollar, 2000) . When the price of oil crashed and income plunged in the oil-producing countries, the aid dried up. This particular combination of circumstances gives us a unique tool to test the effectiveness of this particular form of aid.
As can be seen from Figure 1 , aid given by OPEC countries -many of whom are Arab states -tightly follows the price of oil. This suggests that foreign aid disbursements are tracking government receipts. Changes in oil prices thus constitute an exogenous shock to aid received by OPEC's favored nations Since we are interested in the short-run impact of aid on macroeconomic activity, the price of oil -as a significant macroeconomic factor -may be correlated with the outcome variables we are evaluating. But we can incorporate the fact that OPEC aid heavily favored Muslim countries. Although oil prices may directly impact the outcome variables of interest, we will argue that they should not differentially impact these outcomes in Muslim countries. Hence, we can use interactions of the price of oil with dummies for a recipient country's status as a Muslim country as valid instruments for foreign aid. Our treatment therefore is the price of oil and our treated group is Muslim recipients. As our instrument varies greatly over time, we are able to include country fixed effects in our analysis, which eliminates omitted variable bias due to unobservable time-invariant country effects.
1 Moreover, the flow of other funds (e.g. workers'
remittances, private charity) originating from OPEC nations that are potentially correlated with our instrument do not seem to constitute an important threat to the validity of the empirical strategy.
Determining the effectiveness of aid, however, is inherently difficult due to the problem of endogeneity. If donors are motivated by suffering in recipient countries, then aid may be allocated to those countries with lower growth rates. Thus, we would expect to see a negative correlation between aid and growth. Conversely, if donors allocate funds to successful recipients (i.e. those with strong growth performances) one might see a positive correlation between aid and growth. In neither instance would this reflect a causal relationship between aid and growth. To cope with this endogeneity problem, researchers frequently employ an instrumentation strategy (e.g., Hansen and Tarp, 2001; Easterly, 2003; Clemens et al., 2004) . Hansen and Tarp (2001) use many of the instruments employed by most of the papers in this literature. Some of these instruments include: dummy for Egypt, lagged arms imports, policy, log population, aid squared, and lagged aid. Other instruments incorporate the share of a recipient country's area in the tropics (Dalgaard et al, 2004) and whether the country is a "friend" of the U.S., France, OPEC etc. (Boone, 1996) . Yet what our paper adds to these instruments is the identification of a natural experimental setting amenable to an intuitive "difference-in-differences" type analysis.
Armed with our instrument and the fixed effects specification, we examine the short-run effect of foreign aid on aggregate demand, the components of GDP (i.e. consumption, investment), and the balance of payments. Our results suggest that much aid is absorbed and spent in the short-run, mostly on imports. 2 We find an insignificant effect of aid on inflation and the exchange rate. With respect to growth, we find that an increase in aid of one percent of GDP raises economic growth by about 0.2 percent in the first year, but this effect is negligible over the medium run (as measured in 4 years).
Higher household consumption -in particular the consumption of imported goods and services -seems to be the primary driver of the initial jump in economic growth. Using annual data, an increase in aid of one percent of GDP raises private consumption and imports by 0.9 and 1.5 percentage points respectively. While some of the imports are in the form of imported capital equipment, more are in the form of consumption (i.e. non-capital) goods. An inflow of aid equal to one percent of GDP raises imported non-capital goods by around 0.5 percent of GDP in the short-run, which is double that of imported capital goods. This is suggestive that aid produces an income effect where imported consumption goods are more income elastic. Aid does not affect consumption exclusively, as an inflow of aid goes everywhere in the national accounts. An increase in aid of one percent of GDP raises government consumption and investment by 0.2 and 0.3 percent of GDP respectively, and aid is positively correlated with exports. As expected, the rise in total consumption (private plus government) is accompanied by a fall in gross domestic savings which is consistent with Griffin (1970) , Levy (1987) and Boone (1996) . Our coefficient estimate on national savings is -1.1 suggesting that all aid is consumed.
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Using a different data source (that unfortunately excludes many of the oil crisis years), we find that aid has a small effect on the balance of payments. Aid has a modest positive effect on the current account balance (which is expected since aid is part of net current transfers), but this effect is dampened by a widening merchandise trade deficit nearly proportional to the aid inflow. We find that an increase in aid of one percent of GDP causes the trade deficit in goods to widen by a full percentage point of GDP. Aid has no effect on net foreign direct investments or on portfolio investment, most likely due to the existence of historically rigid capital controls in our treatment group. Total reserves, which include holdings of gold, seem to fall slightly in response to an aid inflow.
Of course, aid flows that our instrument picks up may be correlated with additional flows of funds including those from workers' remittances and private charity. This could violate the 2 Aid absorption is defined as the extent to which a country's non-aid external current account deficit widens in response to aid-related increases in aggregate demand, investment, and output more broadly. For more discussion, see Bavan (2005) and Gupta et al. (2006) . 3 Though aid predicts a rise in investment, it is more than offset by the massive increase in net imports as discussed in section 3.3. (Domestic Savings = Investment + Net Exports; -1.1 = 0.3 -1.4).
exclusion restriction and threaten the validity of our empirical strategy. However, when we examine this directly we find that one dollar of instrumented aid picks up approximately a dollar of current transfers, the vast majority of which is the aid inflow itself. The unaccounted flows actually seem to head out from the country: a one-percentage point of GDP increase in aid leads to over 0.2 percentage points of negative errors and omissions.
Our findings for growth, the national accounts, savings, and the balance of payments are robust to controls for the political and industrial structure in the recipient country. As an additional robustness check, we estimate the effect of aid on our key variables using a dynamicpanel general methods of moments (GMM) estimator, which scholars have recently argued provides more consistent estimates for determining the effectiveness of aid (Hansen and Tarp, 2001; Rajan and Subramanian, 2005b) .
The next section covers the instrument, the estimation strategy, data, and our first stage regression results. Having discussed our specification in section two, we examine how aid trickles through the economy by estimating our empirical model on a variety of outcome variables. We describe these results in section three. In the fourth section, we subject our main findings to some robustness checks. The fifth section concludes.
Specification and Data

Instrument
Until very recently, the only significant providers of bilateral development assistance outside western developed countries were Arab OPEC members, specifically Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates (Neumayer, 2002) . Our best estimate of total aid disbursed by OPEC donor countries between 1960 and 2004 is at least $240 billion. 4 Arab donors have been relatively generous with their foreign aid, donating on average 1.5 percent of their GDP between 1974 and 1994, which exceeds the 0.7 percent recommended by the United Nations (which most developed countries fall short of); this amounted to 13.5 percent of total development aid dispersed over the same period (Neumayer, 2003, 134) .
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As Figure 1 demonstrates, total OPEC aid distributed by OPEC donors tracks the price of oil. This source of aid begins with the rising price of oil in [1973] [1974] . Aid increased sharply then leveled off at a high level through the early 1980s, after which it dropped as the oil embargo began to fail. There are two additional spikes in OPEC aid (and a corresponding increase in the price of oil) during the first Gulf War (1990 War ( -1991 and following the attacks of September 11 th 2001.
The destination of OPEC aid heavily favors Muslim countries (Hallwood and Sinclair, 1981; Hunter, 1984 (Angrist, 2003) ; essentially only aid from OPEC to its Muslim allies. This means that we will not be measuring the impact of aid in general, but we will be measuring the average impact of this type of aid. We note that in contrast to the vast majority of current aid programs, this aid was largely unconditional block grants to finance ministries (Hallwood and Sinclair, 1981; Hunter, 1984) . While Western aid has been often tied to contracts with the donor country "Arab aid has practically never been tied, with the exception of relatively unimportant specific loans and grants for oil purchases" (Neumayer, 2002, 15) . This type of "free money" represents a consistent form of aid that is still applied in many situations across the globe; our experiment has the advantage of not testing the impact of conditional Western aid, whose changing fashions are unlikely to be repeated.
Specification
Armed with this instrument, our empirical setup involves the standard aid-on-growth specification with fixed effects, taking advantage of the two stage least squares (2SLS) setup:
Other donor countries may reduce their flows to the particular countries that benefit from petrodollars. To the extent that there is perfect crowding out, this would not be a valid instrument. Yet this is simple to verify: our first stage regresses these instruments on total aid, not OPEC aid, and they are still highly significant. and log of population (aid is biased towards smaller countries). Consistent with other 2SLS papers in the foreign aid literature, additional controls include: lagged growth, the occurrence of war within the country, M2 as a percent of GDP (which serves as a measure of financial development), and inflation.
As we include dummy variables for year and country as part of our fixed effects specification, it is not necessary to introduce any other spatial or temporal dummies such as world regions, ethnolinguistic fractionalization, or Cold War era. To avoid endogeneity problems we do not include any variables that directly measure our chosen outcome variables, namely the components of aggregate demand, savings, investment, the balance of payment, and GDP more broadly. Further details on the all the included variables and their summary statistics are available in Appendices B and C.
As we are interested in the short-run effects of aid on the economy, we estimate regressions using annual data as well as data averaged over intervals of 4 years. These periods (1960-1963, 1964-1967, etc.) are intended to help smooth some fluctuations in both the independent and dependent variables, but still effectively account for the heterogeneity in our instrument over time. For the annual frequency data we estimate our initial set of regressions using Newey-West standard errors that allow for autocorrelation up to one lag period. 7 We estimate our 4-year averaged regressions using ordinary least squares (OLS) with Huber-White standard errors. 8 Table 1 reports the results of the first stage regression. Column 1 describes the effect of oil prices on the amount of foreign aid received by non-oil producer Muslim countries. The coefficient on aid is 1.1 which means that an increase in the price of oil by $10 provides a windfall of foreign aid to non-oil producer Muslim countries equal to 1.1 percent of GDP. The control variables have the expected signs: richer and more populous countries receive less aid (as a percent of GDP), financial developed countries receive less aid, and growth, inflation, and the occurrence of war are insignificant. The F-test on the instrument yields a value of 28.8 easily exceeding the threshold for weak instruments of 10 suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997) .
First-stage Regression
Our instrument also performs well in the regressions using data averaged over 4 years.
An increase in the price of oil by $10 provides an average windfall of foreign aid to non-oil
Muslim countries equal to 1.3 percent of GDP. The control variables continue to have the expected signs, and the F-test on our instrument (20.7) exceeds the threshold for weak instruments. The strength of the first stage regression at both annual and 4 year frequencies allows us to run two stage least squares on a variety of outcome variables.
To confirm that these effects are being driven through aid and not GDP we rerun the specifications in columns 1 and 2 on aid per capita. While the F-statistics are weaker than in the first two columns, the instrument retains strong predictive power. A $10 increase in the price of oil is associated with more than eight dollars in aid per capita.
Results
To examine how aid trickles through the economy, we estimate our empirical specification on key macroeconomics variables. Section 3.1 looks at the marginal effect of aid on aggregate demand: growth, inflation, and the exchange rate. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 report the effect the effect of aid on the national accounts (i.e., consumption, investment, etc.), domestic savings, and types of imported goods. Section 3.4 tracks the effect of aid on the sub-accounts of the current and capital accounts.
Aggregate Demand
Aid and growth
A transfer of funds from one country to another raises the recipient government's level of available funds. As such, an inflow of aid should provide an economic stimulus, representing an outward shift in aggregate demand. All else equal, this should raise output (growth) and prices.
We directly test for this effect. Table 2 note that aid has very little effect on growth in the medium term. With our 2SLS specification (column 5), the coefficient on average aid is slightly negative (-0.01) and not significant.
We note that our coefficient estimates for growth using annual data are similar to existing studies. In most aid-growth studies, the estimated impact of aid on short-run growth is around 0.15 (e.g., see Hansen and Tarp, 2000 for these findings). In a widely cited study, Burnside and Dollar (2000) find that an increase in effective development assistance (EDA) of one percent of GDP raises growth by about 0.20 percentage points in good policy environments.
Aid and prices: inflation and the exchange rate
The first two rows of table 3 report the effect of aid on two measures of prices: inflation (measured as the annual percentage change in consumer prices) and the exchange rate (measured as the annual percentage change in the nominal exchange rate with the United States). Each cell represents the coefficient on the aid term and we use a balanced panel. The dependent variables for each case of comparison are described in the rows.
We regress inflation on aid and our standard controls (but we exclude the GDP deflator) with a fixed effects specification. In the 2SLS specification, an increase in aid of one percent of GDP raises inflation by 5 percent, but this is not statistically significant. Aid has a positive but statistically insignificant effect on inflation in the lagged aid regression and a rather large, but statistically insignificant effect in the 4-year averaged regression. These results should be interpreted with some caution as the inflation variable is very noisy. For our sample we calculate that consumer prices, on average, rise by nearly 57 percent a year (with a standard deviation of 710).
A surge in foreign exchange in any form (i.e. from private capital flows, exporting earnings, or aid) can cause an appreciation in the exchange rate, thereby shifting production to non-tradables and demand to tradeables. This so-called Dutch Disease phenomenon may therefore result in a loss of competitiveness in the export sector, which in turn may slow long-run growth as export industries are typically technological leaders within a country (Rajan and Subramanian, 2005a) . Row 2 in Table 3 reports the effect of aid on the annual percentage change in the nominal exchange rate. 9 In all 5 regressions, aid leads to a slight appreciation of the exchange rate, ranging from 0.20 to 0.50 percentage points. In our preferred 2SLS regressions this effect is not statistically significant. Given the noise on inflation, however, it is hard to say what the effect is on the real exchange rate.
National Income Identity
9 Data coverage on the real exchange rate is poor.
While we see that aid has a limited effect on broad measures of aggregate demand, this may simply be the result of a limited impact or it could be hiding larger but countervailing effects. Table 3 reports the effect of aid on the components of the national income identity, namely consumption, government expenditures, investment, exports, and imports. Each cell represents the coefficient on the aid term and we have a balanced panel. If aid is being spent and consumed, we should expect aid to raise government consumption (and possibly investment) and lead to a widening of the trade deficit.
Aid and private consumption
We first examine private consumption. Our dependent variable is household final consumption expenditure as a share of GDP (row 3 in table 3 ). An increase in aid of one percent of GDP raises private consumption in that year by almost one percentage point, which is significant at the one-percent level. With lagged aid and 4-year-averaged aid the coefficient estimate falls to around 0.8, but still remains significant. There are three likely channels to explain the nearly one-to-one association between aid and private consumption: the government reduces taxes in response to the aid inflow (Heller, 1975) , the government uses the aid for transfers and subsidies, and/or the aid is distributed in the form of higher wages (Friedman, 1958; Bauer, 1972; Devarajan and Swaroop, 1998) .
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While models of foreign aid and taxation starting with Heller (1975) suggest that governments can use foreign aid to reduce taxes, the empirical evidence is mixed. Heller's original study of 11 countries from around 1960 to 1971 found a negative association between aid and taxes. More recently, with a larger number of countries over a longer period, Boone (1996) and Feyzioglu, Swaroop, and Zhu (1998) find no link between aid and taxes. Boone's study is particularly insightful in modeling the fiscal behavior of three types of governments: laissezfaire, egalitarian, and elitist. Under reasonable parameters, only laissez-faire governments use aid to reduce taxation -egalitarian and elitist governments will apply the aid directly to transfers. The typical Muslim country in our treatment group tends to be autocratic, suggesting that these countries are likely to transfer their aid.
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general the relationship between aid and these variables is not statistically significant. But the signs are consistent with the aforementioned logic: aid is negatively correlated with tax revenues and is associated with a rise in government subsidies and other transfers. Data on government wages are unavailable.
Aid and government consumption
Boone's study further suggests that aid will raise government spending regardless of the type of government regime. The fourth row in Table 3 presents the effect of aid on government final consumption expenditures (as a share of GDP). This variable includes all government current expenditures for purchases of goods and services (including compensation to employees), but does not include government capital formation. 13 We find that a one percent of GDP increase in aid raises government spending by 0.20 percent of GDP but this is not statistically significant.
Our point estimate from the 4-year-averaged data is similar (0.21) but is lower with lagged aid (0.06). Our estimates are surprisingly lower than some other studies, and imply a fairly large government spending multiplier given the effect of aid on household consumption. Many scholars have argued that aid is often fungible and channeled into military expenditure (e.g., Feyzioglu et al, 1998) . While some of this is in the form of ammunition, some is likely to be in the construction of military bases and installations. Our measure of gross capital formation includes government expenditures on national defense and security. Unfortunately, we
can not separate the component of gross capital formation dedicated to national security projects.
We do however have a measure of total military expenditures as a share of GDP. We regress aid on military expenditures in our fixed effects specification and surprisingly find that an inflow of aid equal to one percent of GDP is correlated with a reduction in military expenditures (as a share of GDP) of 0.60 percentage points. 16 This relationship between aid and military expenditures, however, is not statistically significant.
Aid and investment
The fifth row in Table 3 presents the marginal effect of aid on investment. Our measure of investment is gross capital formation which consists of private and government outlays on fixed assets, net changes in the levels of inventories, and net acquisitions of valuables. 17 The coefficient estimate on aid from our 2SLS regression is 0.31 and is not significant. This point estimate is higher than some recent studies. Depending on the model, Boone for example finds that the marginal propensity to invest from aid is insignificantly different from zero. 
Aid and trade
A large portion of domestic capital in developing countries is imported (Eaton and Kortum, 2001; Alfaro and Hammel, 2006) . This import bill is financed either from export earnings or foreign capital inflows, such as foreign aid. Whether exports rise or fall in response to an aid inflow in the short-run is difficult to predict ex ante, although some evidence suggests exports will fall (Rajan and Subramanian, 2005b; Prati and Tressel, 2006) . 19 To examine this further we assess the marginal effect of aid on exports and imports separately.
The sixth row in Table 4 reports the coefficients on aid with exports of goods and services (as a share of GDP) as the dependent variable. In all the regressions, the coefficient on aid is positive (ranging from 0.10 to 0.20 in our 2SLS regressions) but not statistically significant.
How does the response of exports compare to imports in the short-run? The marginal effect of aid on imports of goods and services is reported in the seventh row of Table 4 , which rise by a large amount. In all the regressions, the coefficient on aid is positive and highly significant (at the 1-percent level). Our coefficient estimates on aid from the 2SLS regressions are triple those from the potentially-biased OLS regressions. We find that a one-percentage-point increase in aid (as a share of GDP) raises import consumption by 1.5 percent of GDP. Combining this with our coefficient estimates on exports means that the trade balance widens by -1.4 percent of GDP. We note that this effect from aid is larger than any of those reported by Prati and Tressel (2006) who find that an increase in aid of one percent of GDP deteriorates the trade balance in the range of 0.16 to 0.23 percentage points of GDP with various OLS and GMM estimations.
Import Decomposition and Savings
Is the seemingly large import surge associated with aid inflows detrimental to the macroeconomy in the short-run? If recipient countries are spending all the aid on consumption goods this could be problematic; however, if some is spent on investment goods this could have a beneficial effect for growth (e.g., Chenery and Strout, 1966) . To analyze this possibility we examine the composition of imports. Unfortunately the World Development Indicators do not report the composition of imports by types of goods, so we derive import shares from highly disaggregated world import data for the period 1962-2000.
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19 Rajan and Subramanian (2005b) argue that a real exchange rate appreciation due to additional aid may cause slower growth in export-oriented, labor-intensive industries relative to other manufacturing industries. Similarly, Prati and Tressel (2006) We examine the import composition of capital, automobile, and all other goods. Rows 1-3 in table 4 report the marginal effect of aid on shares of imported capital, automobiles, and other goods (as a percent of GDP). 21 Aid has a positive and almost uniformly significant effect on imported capital, automobile-related, and non-capital goods. An inflow of aid equal to one percent of GDP raises the import of capital goods by 0.23 percent of GDP. The marginal effect of aid on raising imported non-capital goods is nearly double (at 0.45 percent of GDP). Thus, while the marginal effect of aid is consistently larger on imported non-capital goods, some aid is spent on foreign capital goods.
Examining the shares of these type of goods to total imports (rows 4-6 in table 5), however, suggests an inclination for the purchases of foreign consumption goods rather than capital goods. This is consistent with an income effect from aid where consumption goods are more income elastic (relative to capital goods). A one-percentage-point increase in aid decreases the import share of capital goods by 0.3 percent of total imports. With lagged aid, the import share of capital declines by 0.4 percentage points. While this figure is statistically significant at the 5-percent level, its magnitude is not economically huge. For the typical poor country in our sample with GDP equal to about $42 billion, a back-of-the-envelope calculation reveals that $4.8 million in imports is diverted from capital to non-capital goods from an increase in aid equal to one percent of GDP. 22 In the 4-year-average regressions, the effects look similar.
We can take our analysis of imports further. By re-arranging the national accounts identity and looking specifically at the financing of investment we know that investment equals the sum of domestic savings and net exports. Over the years, numerous studies have examined the relationship between aid and savings, generally finding a negative relationship. 23 Our results are consistent with these findings, but our estimates suggest that all aid is consumed (last row of table 5). Our measure of savings is gross domestic savings (as a share of GDP), which is the sum of private and government savings. 24 In all five models, the coefficient on aid is negative and highly significant (p-value<.01). What does this negative effect imply? As Papanek (1972) and Newlyn (1973) first pointed out, what matters is that the coefficient is between 0 and -1. This implies that aid will raise investment. If the coefficient is less than -1, this implies that all aid is consumed (nothing is saved). Based on this interpretation, our 2SLS point estimates of -0.8, -0.9, and -1.1 suggest that a substantial portion of aid is consumed in the short-run.
Finally we note that our coefficient estimates for aid on investment, imports, exports, and savings add up appropriately. The marginal effect of aid on investment is 0.3, on savings is -1.1, and on net imports is 1.4. According to the basic national income identity: I = S + (M -X).
Thus we have 0.3 = -1.1 + 1.4. Summing up our coefficients for the national accounts identity (Y=C+G+I+X-M) is equal to approximately zero, consistent with aid's not being produced within the country's borders.
Balance of Payments
Recent commitments by industrialized countries to "scale up aid" to impoverished countries have refocused attention in development agencies to the likely effect on those countries' external balance (e.g. Gupta et al, 2006) . Each cell in table 5 reports the marginal effect of aid on the various components of the current and capital accounts from the balance of payments (BOP).
The original source of the BOP data is the International Monetary Fund's Balance of Payment
Annual Yearbook and International Financial Statistics (IFS), whereas the original source of our national accounts data is the OECD and the United Nations. By introducing a new data source, this analysis serves as an additional validity check on the import and export findings from the previous section. We note that the number of observations in our treatment group with the BOP data is about half of that with the national accounts data in the 1970s. Thus, our 2SLS coefficient estimates may not fully account for the effects of instrumented aid on various parts of the balance of payments, especially during the period of high (and volatile) oil prices in the 1970s.
Aid and the current account
The current account is the sum of a country's trade balance, net factor income, and net transfer payments. The marginal effect of aid on the current account balance is positive (ranging from about 0.15 to 0.30 percentage point of GDP) but not significant. The trade balance, however, dampens the effect on the current account balance. Looking at trade in goods and trade in services separately, we see that aid worsens the merchandise balance (in the range of -0.65 to -1 percent of GDP).
Exports of goods fall (by about 0.14 to 0.26 percent of GDP), suggesting that strong domestic aggregate demand might be sucking in exports for domestic consumption. As we have already seen, aid significantly raises the level of imported goods (row 3). Turning to trade in services (rows 4 and 5), the marginal effect of aid on exports of services is positive (and statistically significant with our annual 2SLS estimates). The marginal effect of aid is also positive on imports of services. For most of our sample, however, the volume of trade in goods dominates those in traded services. The marginal effect of aid on the overall trade balance is negative in the short-run. Combining the marginal effects of aid on trade in goods and services yields an estimate that an increase in aid of 1 percent of GDP deteriorates the overall trade balance by 0.8 percent of GDP.
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The current account also includes entries for income and current transfers. We find that aid has a negative and significant effect on income receipts and income payments (rows 6 and 7). 26 The negative coefficient on the former implies a capital outflow. We speculate that these signs may be due to evolving definitions for the various entries in the balance of payments recorded in the underlying IFS data (IMF, 1995) . 27 Moreover, it is likely that individual countries may be reporting different measures of these series. 28 Nevertheless, our coefficient estimates on income payments and receipts suggest that the marginal effect of aid on net income is zero.
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As expected, aid has a positive and significant effect on net current transfers (although the coefficient is less than 1, suggesting outflows in the other components of current transfers, such as charitable contributions, or that not all of the official aid reaches the target nation). In addition to foreign aid, another important component of current transfers is workers' remittances.
We find that an increase in aid of one percent of GDP increases the flows of workers remittances by around 0.25 percent of GDP and this effect is statistically significant. As our instrument picks up the effect of higher oil prices, higher remittances are likely due to the influx of migrant workers from Muslim countries to the Gulf States following the oil price spikes (Jureidini, 2003) coupled with the higher wages (associated with higher oil prices) paid to migrants working on oil fields in the Middle East. 25 We sum the coefficient on exports of goods and exports of services and subtract the coefficients on imports of goods and the imports of services. Our coefficient estimate is then -0.8. The data that generate these estimates are different, and have a slightly different sample, then those from table 3. While this number is smaller than those in table 3, the general picture is the same. 26 Payments on direct investment, portfolio investment, and other investments and receipts on reserve assets. 27 The fifth edition of the IMF's Balance of Payments Manual (BPM) defines the "current account" as encompassing transactions in goods, services, and the receipts/payments of current transfers. The current account in the BPM4 (which was used prior to 1995) included transactions in goods, services, and all transfers. Moreover, BPM5 reclassifies income and services separately; in BPM4 income was a subcomponent of services. For more on these revised definitions, see IMF (1995) . 28 Countries may, for example, exclude payments on services to foreigners associated with imports in their measure of income payments (IMF, 1993) . 29 We subtract the coefficient on income payments from income receipts.
Aid and the capital account
With the exception of total reserves and net errors and omissions, foreign aid has very little effect on the capital account (bottom half of Aid has a statistically significant (at the 5 percent level) but negative effect on net errors and omissions, which would include unofficial (untracked) transactions such as back-channel charitable contributions and discrete transfers to offshore accounts. As charitable contributions from Arab oil-producers are likely to surge following oil price hikes, we would expect this coefficient to be positive. To explain this negative coefficient, we speculate that some aid was "recycled" to off-shore accounts. During this period, petrodollar recycling through Western countries was prevalent by Arab oil producers. Similar recycling by the recipients of Arab foreign aid thus would not be unreasonable.
Instead of "picking up" the expected off-the-books monetary inflow to poor Muslim countries from oil exporters, the negative sign on errors and omissions suggests that some aid is leaking out. These flows (as well as those from charities and workers' remittances) could bias our instrument. For the price of oil interacted with Muslim to serve an appropriate instrument for aid, it must satisfy the exclusion restriction: the shock to OPEC nations' wealth must only affect economies of poor Muslim countries through foreign aid. This exclusion restriction would be violated if these other flows constitute a large effect on the economies of poor Muslim countries.
With our BOP data we can test whether the exclusion restriction is violated.
A direct violation of the exclusion restriction would imply a coefficient estimate greater than 1 on net current transfers. This is not the case (table 5, row 8) as the coefficient estimate on net current transfers is approximately 1 (our estimate is around 0.9). Workers remittances rise by a quarter point of aid on average. The coefficient estimate of around -0.2 on net errors and omissions (which is likely to include private contributions) provides evidence that some aid is leaking out. On net, then, it appears that one dollar of our instrumented aid picks up approximately one dollar of current transfers, the majority of which is aid itself. 30 We verified this claim by examining measures of capital account liberalization from the IMF Annual Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Rate Restrictions as discussed in Alfaro and Hammel (2006) . We calculate that about 70 percent of Muslim countries restrict capital account transactions over the period 1966-1995. Moreover, using the WDI data we find that on average net FDI inflows amount to less than 1 percent of GDP for Muslim recipients in our sample (compared to 1.6 percent of GDP for non-Muslim countries).
4 Robustness checks
Economic structure and politics
Our first robustness check accounts for the possibility that Muslim countries have some other characteristics that systematically bias their responses to changes in the price of oil. If the only terms in our regressions correlated with the price of oil are in the instrument, then we may
attribute to aid what in reality is working through some other channel. Although it is impossible to control for every such conceivable channel, we consider two potential ones that are the most salient.
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First, we consider whether a country's economic structure matters. The direct impact of oil prices on an economy depends crucially on that economy's dependence on oil. As a proxy for this, we consider the extent of industrialization in a country, measured by the percentage of the population that was rural in 1960. We then interact this with the price of oil.
Second, since Dollar and Burnside (2000), accounting for institutional quality has regained importance in evaluating the effectiveness of aid. While Dollar and Burnside's results have been disputed (e.g. Subramanian, 2005a and 2005b; Hansen and Tarp, 2001 ), they nonetheless ring true with practitioners, having informed aid policy over the previous decade, and we check to see whether "policies" affect our main results. Countries with different political institutions -in particular, dictatorships versus democracies -often have different economic agendas, and may react differently when input prices rise. We include a direct measure of regime type and also interact this variable with the price of oil.
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Our results are reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 . 33 The inclusion of controls for political institutions and economic structure interacted with the price of oil do not change our core results. Aid generally has a modest, but statistically insignificant, effect on economic growth in the short run. Nearly all of this aid is consumed (rows 2 and 3), but some of it does 31 Another potential robustness check is a test of the level effects of aid on growth. Recently some scholars have modeled this using a non-linear relationship between aid and growth by incorporating an aid squared term in cross country regressions (e.g., Lensink and White, 2001; Hansen and Tarp, 2001 ). These studies generally find positive, but decreasing marginal returns to aid flows. We tested for the level effects of aid in our standard model and find that instrumented aid squared (i.e. muslim*p(oil) 2 ), in the presence of instrumented aid, is typically positive but insignificant in all the regressions (where the dependent variables are the components of GDP). The coefficient on aid squared is negative when the dependent variable is government consumption and the current account balance. 32 Our political control is a binary variable that measures whether the country was an autocracy in 1972. Using Marshall and Jagger's (2002) POLITY IV data set, we classify a country autocratic if it had a POLITY2 score between -5 and -10. We choose 1972 as this is the year with the best data coverage before the price of oil rose sharply. 33 We report coefficient estimates from using annual observations corresponding to columns one and two of the previous tables. Our robustness checks using 4-year-averaged data are similar to those reported earlier.
raise investment (row 4). Our coefficient estimates for aid's marginal effect on both imports and exports are slightly higher than before, and the import surge remains statistically significant. The effect of aid on gross domestic savings is negative and is less than -1 in our 2SLS regressions.
Finally, aid improves the current account balance, but this effect is not significant.
Dynamic Panel Estimation
Our second robustness check concerns our estimation procedure. Various scholars argue that the relationship between aid and growth is clearly dynamic and that standard OLS and 2SLS estimations will yield inconsistent parameters (Hansen and Tarp, 2001; Dalgaard et al, 2004) .
One approach to estimate more consistent parameters and to address potential endogeneity in the regressors is to use a dynamic panel General Methods of Moments (GMM) regression. There are various strategies to estimate this type of regression. Hansen and Tarp (2001) , for example, use an Arellano-Bond "difference" GMM estimator to test the effect of foreign aid on growth, while Rajan and Subramanian (2005b) employ both a "difference" and "system" estimator. Neither paper incorporates fixed effects (as these are purged in the estimation strategy). 34 To incorporate fixed effects in a standard IV setup we re-estimate our model utilizing an IV-GMM estimator developed by Schaffer (2005) .
To our knowledge no other study has tracked the effects of aid on the various parts of the national accounts and the balance of payments using a GMM estimator. Prati and Tressel (2006) , for example, use GMM estimation to discern the effect of aid on exports and the trade balance, but do not look at other parts of the national accounts. Our results are reported in columns 3-5 of table 6. 35 The third column reports the coefficient estimates of aid using our GMM estimator.
We note that the standard errors are tighter than those reported in column 1 of table 3. The coefficient estimates of interest (with instrumented aid) are reported in the last two columns.
Column 4 reports the coefficient estimate on instrumented aid using our IV-GMM estimator. To 34 Both specifications rely on first-differencing and using lagged values of the endogenous variables as instruments. They differ in that the Arellano-Bond (1991) "difference" estimator uses lagged levels as instruments for the differenced right hand side variables, whereas the Blundell-Bond (1998) "system" estimator the estimate system equation comprises the difference equation instrumented with lagged levels as in the Arellano-Bond estimator as well as the level equation, which is estimated using lagged differences as instruments. If we were to pursue these strategies, first-differencing would dampen the strength of our instrument (muslim*price of oil) to render it useless, as the time path of the Muslim aid windfall depicted in figure 1 suggests. 35 A potential drawback with panel GMM estimation is that the researcher is allowed to exercise considerably more degrees of freedom than with traditional OLS estimation. For instance, the researcher must decide which variables' lags will be used as instruments, how many lags to be used for instrumentation, etc. We attempt to be as transparent as possible in this regard.
capture the dynamic process of our LHS variables, the coefficient estimates reported in column 5
are from regressions that include a one-period lag in the dependent variable as a control.
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With both instrumental-variable GMM estimators, we find that aid has a positive but statistically insignificant effect on growth in the short-run (our coefficient estimate is 0.2). This is consistent with our earlier finding reported in table 2. This particular finding, however, does not definitely mean that aid necessarily translates to higher growth. Hansen and Tarp (2001) also find a positive effect of aid on growth but acknowledge (as do Rajan and Subramanian, 2005b) that the estimated effectiveness of aid is highly sensitive to the choice of GMM estimator and the set of control variables. In general, our GMM estimates for aid's effect on the components of the national accounts, savings, and the current account balance support our earlier findings: more aid is consumed than invested and much of this is in the form of higher imports.
Discussion
Foreign aid represents a real resource transfer, envisioned to augment domestic resources and to leave the recipient country's economy better off. How this aid is ultimately spent therefore determines how effective it is in achieving its purposes. Over the years there have been hundreds of studies gauging the impact of aid on economic growth and overall development, with mixed
findings. Yet these studies have not tested the impact of exogenous changes in aid that vary within countries over time. Using yearly variations in the price of oil, we construct a new instrument to examine how aid is spent by tracking the short-run impact of petro-aid on aggregate demand, prices, the national accounts, savings, and the balance of payments in poor Muslim countries. As our instrument varies over time we are able to include a fixed-effects setup which reduces omitted variable bias. Our results are robust to controlling for the recipient country's political regime and infrastructure or to using a dynamic panel estimation. Our main finding is that this particular type of aid does affect the whole economy in the short-run, but is primarily spent on consumption.
The supposition that foreign aid is intended to have beneficial macroeconomic effects, most notably to raise a country's economic growth rate has its analytical foundations in traditional Harrod-Domar type models of economic growth. In these models, aid is viewed as filling various "gaps" in savings, trade, and foreign exchange to channel resources -mainly through the accumulation of physical capital -to raise aggregate demand and thus spur economic 36 The inclusion of a lagged dependent variable is likely to lead to a downward bias in the estimates of our explanatory variables.
growth (Chenery and Strout, 1966) . Gap-type models provide a simple analytical framework to think about the effects of aid.
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We find that aid has a small, but statistically insignificant effect on aggregate demand.
An inflow of aid equal to one percentage point of GDP raises next year's growth rate by 0.2 percent and contributes to a modest (but statistically insignificant) increase in prices. The burst in aid appears to trickle throughout the whole economy. Thinking simply in a Keynesian-type framework, a transfer of funds from one country to another raises the recipient government's level of available funds, which should provide an economic stimulus with income and multiplier effects. Our results show that all the components of the national accounts (C, G, I, X, and M) increase in response to an inflow of aid, even though the greater shares go towards consumption and imports.
Increased imports may not be bad, if the imported goods can be used for productive purposes, such as raising the level or quality of the domestic capital stock. Using disaggregated trade data, we provide evidence that some aid is spent on imported capital goods, however the share of these goods to total imports declines in response to additional aid. So while countries are spending aid on some "good" imports, there is a preference for not-so-good imports. Such an inclination may reflect a lack of complementary between intermediate goods and low levels of human capital which make the acquisition of physical capital unattractive in many developing countries (Barba-Navaretti et al, 2000; Mayer, 2000) . Moreover, the marginal effect of additional aid seems to be associated with national dissaving. Our finding that an increase in aid of one percent of GDP decreases domestic savings in the short-run by 0.8 to 1.1 percent of GDP suggests an aid windfall crowds out savings, a relationship that is well supported in the empirical literature (e.g., see Hansen and Tarp, 2000) .
These factors are in line with Easterly's (2001 Easterly's ( , 2003 views on the effectiveness of aid.
In particular, Easterly casts doubt as to whether aid does in fact contribute to higher investment and growth (as generally prescribed in gap-type models). As he documents, only 6 out of 88 countries from 1965-1995 showed any positive growth due to higher foreign-aid-induced investment. The positive association we find between aid and investment in the short and medium run may reflect the allocation decisions of Arab aid agencies. While the bulk of OPEC aid has been in grant form and never been tied to specific goods and services, some Arab aid has been channeled into physical infrastructure projects in the transport and telecommunications, industry and mining, and energy sectors (Neumayer, 2002, Table 7 ).
Our finding that aid has a minimal (near zero) effect on the financial account (i.e., FDI inflows, portfolio investment, etc) in the 2SLS regressions should not be surprising, as most of the poor Muslim countries in our sample imposed tight capital controls over our period of analysis. Instead, aid mostly shows up in the current account (primarily in the form of significantly higher imports of goods and services) and as an outflow in errors and omissions.
Our instrumented aid is much larger than other concurrent flows, such as workers' remittances, which could potentially threaten the validity of our empirical strategy by violating the exclusion restriction.
In sum, the oil-driven bonuses in foreign aid from wealthy Arab oil producers to their poor Muslim allies were mostly consumed on imported non-capital goods. The aid crowded out domestic savings and did little to attract foreign investment. Long-run economic growth was unaffected. That said, the popular critique that aid is "wasted" hardly rings true with the data from this natural experiment. Every component of the domestic economy, including investment, was raised in the short run. Giving money to poor governments does seem an effective way to stimulate the economy. Indeed, foreign aid may be an effective tool of fiscal policy that can be used to smooth the business cycle in developing countries. The challenge remains how to convert that temporary stimulus to lasting economic growth. With annual data, Newey-West standard errors in brackets with first order autocorrelation structure. For averaged data, robust standard errors in brackets. Country and year fixed effects included. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Column I. OLS with Newey-West standard errors (with first order autocorrelational structure), annual data, includes country and year fixed effects with RHS variables as in Table 2 . Column II. 2SLS with Newey-West standard error (with first order autocorrelational structure), annual data, includes country and year fixed effects with RHS variables as in Table 2 . Aid is instrumented with p(oil)*Muslim.
Column III. Same as regression in column II. We use 1 period lagged aid instead of current aid. We report the coefficient estimate on lagged aid. Aid is instrumented with p(oil)*Muslim.
Column IV. OLS with robust standard errors, 4 year averaged data, includes country and year fixed effects with RHS variables as in Table 2 .
Column V. 2SLS with robust standard errors, 4 year averaged data, includes country and year fixed effects. Aid is instrumented with p(oil)*Muslim. ‡ CPI (% annual) has the following number of observations: 1856 (columns 1 & 2), 1850 (column 3), and 518 (columns 4 & 5). 
